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SYMPOSIUM
LAW, ETHICS, AND THE GOOD SAMARITAN:
SHOULD THERE BE A DUTY TO RESCUE?
Kathleen M. Ridolfi*
I. INTRODUCTION
Anyone who has ever been to law school remembers
reading the 1884 case of Regina v Dudley and Stephens.! The
predicament faced by the parties and the court is hard to
forget.
Somewhere on the sea between England and Australia,
four men found themselves floating on a thirteen-foot dinghy
after their ship sank in a storm. All were starving and
dehydrated, but worst off was the youngest, a boy named
Parker who had ignored the warnings of the more
experienced sailors and drank the deadly seawater.
On the twentieth day of this ordeal, Dudley, the captain
of the crew, and Stephens, his first mate, decided their only
chance for survival was to kill the near-death Parker, feed on
his body, and hope for rescue. Four days later, as it turned
out, a ship did come by and they were rescued. When the
sailors reached shore, they told of their ordeal and what they
had done, and were charged with murder.
In a sensational public trial, the horrifying facts captured
worldwide attention. It was proven at trial that young
Parker was so sick at the time he was killed that he would
not have been alive four days later to be rescued. It was also
true that had the defendants not killed and eaten the boy,
* Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. J.D., Rutgers
University; B.A., Rutgers University.
1. Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (Q.B. 1884).
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they probably would not have survived either.
The court grappled with the extraordinarily difficult
question of whether killing Parker under these extreme
circumstances was murder. Although the court sympathized
with the defendants, it nonetheless convicted Dudley and
Stephens of murder and sentenced them to death.' In the
words of the court, "We are often compelled to set up
standards we cannot reach ourselves, and to lay down rules
which we could not ourselves satisfy."
The moral complexities of the judgment and the extreme
underlying conduct of the seamen has continued to make
Dudley and Stephens a lively subject of debate and
scholarship more than a century after it happened.3 Some
think the defendants were justified in their actions or at least
should have been excused under the extraordinary
circumstances. Others believe the court was right, that there
is never a moral privilege that would grant a legal exception
for taking an innocent life. In this introduction, I want to
move away from these important questions about murder and
on to another crucial, but less familiar, aspect of the case: the
matter of Dudley's and Stephens' hope for and eventual
rescue. I suggest that there are several things about this case
that go beyond its dramatic facts to plague us still.
To underscore how little is owed by way of a duty to
rescue under Anglo-American law, let us return to the raft for
another hypothetical. Assume that young sailor Parker,
while lying there dying, accidentally cut his wrist and needed
a tourniquet to stop the bleeding. Seeing his helpless
condition, Dudley and Stephens simply turn the other way,
let him die, and, as in the actual case, feed on his body to
sustain themselves until they are rescued.
While in its opinion the Dudley and Stephens court made
clear that taking innocent life is absolutely wrong, had the
same court been faced with the facts as presented in this
hypothetical, the defendants would not have been convicted of
2. In December of 1884, the defendants were sentenced to death by
hanging. It was the first time a death sentence had been pronounced in that
court since 1745. However, after serving a short prison sentence, the death
sentence was commuted and they were released. See NEIL HANSON, THE
CUSTOM OF THE SEA 280-288 (1999).
3. Fascination with this case has given it a kind of "legal immortality."
See A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, CANNIBALISM AND THE COMMON LAW 271 (1984).
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murder or, for that matter, faced any criminal responsibility
for the death of the boy. Ironically, a society that draws such
bold and certain lines to protect innocent life, even under the
strained circumstances of Dudley and Stephens, refuses to
impose even a minimal duty to rescue the same innocent life.
The central challenge of this symposium, Law, Ethics,
and The Good Samaritan: Should There Be A Duty To
Rescue?, is to consider why this distinction exists-and
whether it is a good one. Comparing the two different
scenarios in the real and hypothetical cases provides a useful
starting point for discussion. Is the difference between the
two cases a moral one-that is, is it immoral to murder
someone, but acceptable to watch them bleed to death
without rendering assistance?
While murder may be a more culpable act than failure to
rescue, most moral ideals would recognize a duty to aid a
bleeding boy who could not help himself. The explanation for
the distinction therefore must lie elsewhere. I suggest that
the answer lies within the subtext of two other questions.
First, there is the morality/autonomy debate. That is, while
there is no dispute about the right and the obligation of the
state to protect citizens from harm, can the state police
personal morality in the process? The second question, a
more practical concern, is that even if legal prohibitions may
properly track moral ones, does the very nature of an
omission render its regulation or just enforcement impossible
or at least unlikely?
The conundrum posed by these tensions raises a host of
important and intriguing questions that are debated not in
terms of a tragedy on the high seas, but in the more lurid
context of a gambling casino in the outskirts of Las Vegas. It
is within that context-as well as on the streets of ancient
Jericho 4-that the participants debate, though perhaps not
resolve, the following issues:
1. Whether a legal duty to rescue would improperly
impose a moral obligation on citizens in a society that
values individual autonomy;
2. Even without philosophical objections, whether
obstacles in the administration of a law punishing "Bad
Samaritans" would make its just enforcement
4. See Luke 10:27-37 (King James).
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unattainable; and
3. Whether the law should continue to be restricted to
punish the active infliction of harm or whether those few
situations where one is held responsible for a failure to act
should now include a duty to rescue.
By raising these issues in the context of the hypothetical
Dudley and Stephens, I do not mean to suggest that there is
reason to equate an act with an omission, that killing and
letting die are the same. Even an intentional omission does
not make it equivalent to the active infliction of harm.5
Undeniably, taking life and failing to rescue are different, but
are they different enough to justify conviction and death in
the first instance, but no legal condemnation at all in the
second?
II. MORALITY/AUTONOMY DEBATE
Many would claim that action and omissions are
sufficiently distinct to warrant severe punishment in the first
instance but none in second. They would say that the state is
right to protect the public from anyone out to cause harm, but
that the state has no business forcing someone to go to the aid
of somebody else.6 The state can punish an act, but the state
should not punish an omission because that amounts to
monitoring an individual's personal moral code. They might
also say a further justification stems from the conception of
the state as neutral arbiter among conceptions of the good.
Particularly where people do not agree about moral values,
they would limit the state to prevention of harm.7
Nonetheless, most would allow state enforcement of moral
values where the values emerge from an overlapping
consensus of views. There is agreement, for example, that
parents have a moral obligation to protect their children and,
thus, no controversy surrounding a corresponding legal duty.
Proponents of these views oppose Good Samaritan laws
because they believe these laws are inconsistent with a high
5. See Jeremy Waldron, On the Road: Good Samaritans and Compelling
Duties, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1053, 1082 (2000).
6. As Jeremy Waldron discussed, the state enforces citizen support of one
another in a variety of ways, such as through taxes and the welfare system. See
id. at 1073.




regard for individual liberty. They argue that choosing
whether or not to perform a good deed is a personal decision,
a private matter for an individual and her conscience and
that to invade that sphere is a threat to individual autonomy.
Moral issues and legal duties are distinct and should stay
that way.
American law schools may inadvertently promote the
notion that moral issues and legal duties are distinct.8 When
a group of entering law students begins their legal education,
they are taught to "think like lawyers": to analyze issues
without interference from personal feelings, preconceptions,
and cultural, political, or religious beliefs. Emphasis in
American law schools on abstract analysis of legal issues is
sometimes criticized as a deliberate effort to promote the law
and morals distinction to a highly regarded principle, a canon
to be valued on its own. Indeed, it may contribute to the
public perception that lawyers are amoral, irresponsible, and
unethical.
But, it is not true that teaching the skill of legal
reasoning and stressing individual rights as a guiding legal
principle is a rejection of moral values. Law cannot
effectively be taught without also teaching an understanding
and appreciation for the general truth that values are
instilled through culture, religion, and other social
institutions affecting our lives, including the legal system. A
legal system makes sense only with an understanding of the
society that it seeks to regulate.
Of course, social policy, the backdrop of law and sound
legal education, is driven by who we are. Our beliefs, values,
and expectations of one another are what drive lawmakers.
In turn, the law shapes us. The influence of law in shaping
public attitudes was the subject of an experiment conducted
by Henry Kaufman in 1970.' In Kaufman's study, subjects
were asked to evaluate the moral conduct of someone who
refused to aid a drowning victim and he found that subjects
judged that person more harshly when they believed the
omission was unlawful than when they were told there was
8. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
POLITICAL DISCOURSE 85 (1991).
9. See Henry Kaufman, Legality and Harmfulness of a Bystander's Failure
to Intervene as Determines Moral Judgment, in ALTRUISM AND HELPING
BEHAVIOR 77-81 (J. Macauley & L. Berkowitz eds., 1970).
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no legal obligation to help. Through his work, Kaufman
demonstrated that law affects the attitudes of people when
they are made aware of it.'"
That morality is rooted in culture and religion is a truth
as old as the "Ten Commandments" and, in a homogeneous
society, citizens generally share views on moral issues. But
in a diverse society like the United States, where religion and
ethnic tradition are not the common denominator, common
ground lies elsewhere. "[L]aw is now regarded by many
Americans as the principal carrier of those few moral
understandings that are widely shared by our diverse
citizenry."" For Americans, our commonality has its voice in
the law.
The interdependence of law and morality, the circular
influences of one on the other, puts us in a position to fear
what we want the law to do. We embrace a legal system that
promotes morality, that makes better citizens of us, but we
worry that the law will cross an elusive line and infringe on
individual rights. For this reason we are careful, and should
remain so, in limiting enforcement of laws to reflect only
those values that emerge from the overall agreement of the
community where they will be enforced.
Enacting a law that requires a person to go to the aid of
another may help to make that person a better citizen, but it
does raise concern for some. Concern that a Good Samaritan
law would make it impossible to determine what motivated a
rescue-altruism or fear of legal sanction-was raised at the
Symposium. Professor Jeremy Waldron called this a
ridiculous objection, pointing out that identifying what
motivates us to act is often difficult in the best of
circumstances. Moreover, says Waldron, it is irrelevant. No
one "should have to linger in danger so that the rest of us fine
people can secure for ourselves a clearer sense of our own
altruistic virtue.' 2
Nevertheless, while it may be easy to move past the
altruist argument, the disquiet of those who fear
encroachment on individual rights does deserve our attention.
10. See also Hans Zeizel, An International Experiment on the Effects of a
Good Samaritan Law, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW 209-213 (James
M. Ratcliffe ed., 1981).
11. GLENDON, supra note 8, at 87.
12. Waldron, supra note 5, at 1065.
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Individual liberty, a much-guarded interest for Americans, is
well-worth protecting. But, do Good Samaritan laws really
put our liberty at risk?
In her talk, Professor Margalynne Armstrong argues that
the American focus on the protection of individual rights does
not mean doom for Good Samaritan laws. 3 She asserts that
Good Samaritan laws find support in American political
history and tradition, particularly Jeffersonian and civic
republicanism. A duty to rescue, Armstrong says, is not
unlike the obligation to serve on jury duty, a civic
responsibility also enforced by the criminal law. The idea at
its core is that people invested in society make the best
citizens, and the best citizens make decisions that go beyond
their own self interest.
Moreover, there are other examples of forced civic duty.
The law requires that we pay taxes. It even requires us to
rescue in some circumstances, for example, if the person to be
rescued is our charge or employee. The question is not
whether the law may compromise our independence because
it does that all the time. The question is when can it. There
is always a balancing of interests at stake.
The enactment of Good Samaritan laws may be
particularly beneficial as we enter the 21st Century. As
technology advances, it seems we are becoming increasingly
impersonal. We have entered a "dot.com" age of faceless
electronic communication, where the office cubicle has
replaced the old neighborly fence, the place where casual
conversation took place in years past. Enforcing civic
responsibility could prove helpful in reestablishing
relationships and reinforcing identification with the people
around us.
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE NATURAL EVOLUTION
OF A DUTY TO RESCUE
Some believe that our current day legal system's
unwillingness to enforce a duty to rescue is grounded in a
longstanding concern for individual liberty. While no doubt
as Americans we place a high value on individual liberty, the
13. See Margalynne Armstrong, Can Good Samaritan Laws Fit Into the
United States Legal /Political Framework?: A Brief Response to Elspeth Farmer,
Joshua Dressier, and Marc Franklin, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1027 (2000).
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absence of duty to rescue laws did not grow out of considered
reflection and debate about liberty. In its earliest
formulation, our legal system did not punish any omissions,
including failure to rescue. Early law addressed only
affirmative acts. 4  There was no concern for what one
intended to do or with what one should have done. Law was
formal and morally neutral, concerned only with the act itself
and identifying the one who committed it. Moreover, there
were no legal defenses. All crimes were strict liability. Thus,
without regard to the intent of the actor, if a criminal act was
committed, the charged party had only a King's pardon to
turn to for relief."5 Pardons were essential in a system in
which most crimes were felonies punishable by death.
A perfect example is the thirteenth-century story of four-
year-old Katherine Passeavant. 16 Young Katherine was taken
and held at the Saint Albans jail, charged with murder after
she accidentally opened a door, sending another child to his
death in a vat of hot water. There was no infancy defense in
Katherine's day nor was there a requirement that prosecutors
prove intent. Her family had no choice but to go to the King
and beg for mercy. The courts, at that time, were charged
with the application of unequivocal rules. Only the King, as
the personal embodiment of the state, could exercise
individualized judgment and show mercy. In Katherine's
case, her family did successfully prevail upon the King and
eventually the child was released. Still, even in cases where
pardons were granted, the accused or her family was required
to pay restitution to the victim or his family, again without
regard for fault.
In time however, the fundamental injustice of this system
was recognized and strict liability was rejected in favor of a
criminal system based on proof of mens rea. Although the
evolution away from strict liability in civil cases took much
longer, eventually a civil system based, at a minimum, on
negligence also took hold. Today, for someone accused of a
14. See James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, in The Good Samaritan and the
Law, supra note 10, at 1.
15. See KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE
PUBLIC EXPERIENCE (1997).
16. See Kathleen M. Ridolfi, Not Just An Act of Mercy: The Demise of Post-
Conviction Relief and a Rightful Claim to Clemency, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 43, 48 (1998).
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civil or criminal wrong, we ask not only "did you do the act?"
but also, "was the act blameworthy?" In our modern system
of law, "the ethical quality of the defendant's act has become
the measure of his liability instead of the mere physical act
regardless of the motive or fault of the actor."17
If the focus of the law has shifted away from the strictly
technical question of whether the act was committed to an
ethical or moral concern for whether the actor was
blameworthy, should there not also have been a
corresponding move away from technical distinctions, based
on act and omission, to questions regarding whether the
conduct or failure to act was blameworthy? If so, our
hypothetical seamen's unwillingness to reach over and tie the
tourniquet would be judged on the basis of their moral blame
and not based on a distinction regarding whether the harm
resulted from their act or their willful non-act.
IV. PRACTICAL CONCERNS
If moral culpability is the proper basis for legal
responsibility, what reasons remain to justify the vast divide
that continues to exist in the law and continues to set apart
the culpability of people like Dudley and Stephens from their
hypothetical counterparts? None of these men harbored bad
feelings toward the boy or wanted him to die. All were
motivated by the same desire, to save themselves and
perhaps put the dying boy out of his misery.
Moreover, if legal responsibility rests on moral blame,
why would the law distinguish between the culpability of the
hypothetical Captain Dudley and that of shipmate Stephens
by holding the captain of a ship legally obligated to assist
another sailor but not others in a position to help him?
Obviously, concern that a Good Samaritan law would make it
impossible to know where to draw the line has not prevented
us from creating some legal duties. As a matter of fact, we
have imposed duties to act in many situations: when there is
a contract, special status relationship, if someone creates a
risk to another person then fails to act to prevent harm from
occurring, and if someone comes to the aid of another person
but then abandons the effort, leaving the victim in a worse
17. Ames, supra note 14, at 5.
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position.18 Are these relationships different enough to set
them apart from the obligations of the rest of us to a fellow
citizen? Or, are they the best we can do, given the practical
difficulties in administering a law that punishes omissions?
It is nice and tidy to hold a captain liable for his crew,
just as it is to hold a parent liable for a child, but Anglo-
American law has thus far been unwilling to move beyond
easily defined relationships for fear that to do so would create
ambiguity, making it impossible to ever know where liability
begins and where it ends. As citizens, we would not know
what was expected of us.
Again, we are wise to be cautious-but is it really so
difficult to draw lines? Courts routinely engage in
individualized determinations that depend on subjective
intent and a range of excuses and mitigating considerations.
Why not trust the legal system to reach individualized
judgments just as fairly where omissions are concerned?
Several reasons have been suggested, including the
fundamental question of whether workable Good Samaritan
legislation is even possible. Professor Joshua Dressler
believes those who advocate such laws often "punt" when it
comes to bearing the burden of formulating defensible and
workable criteria for the imposition of duties to act.'9
Opponents of Good Samaritan laws believe that such
legislation could lead to serious problems, some of which are
potentially insurmountable.
Among the serious concerns raised by Professor Dressler
is the fear that Good Samaritan laws would allow "police and
prosecutors too much discretion to determine whether and
whom to prosecute.""° Race, background, or even physical
attractiveness of the victim might make some victims "rescue
worthy" but others not. Moreover, the race, background, or
physical attractiveness of the one who failed to rescue might
also influence the decision about whether or not to bring
charges in the first place. Dressler also expressed concern
that prosecutors might be more vulnerable to the pressures of
public outrage, causing political pressures to drive the
decision of whether and whom to prosecute rather than a fair
18. See Joshua Dressier, Some Brief Thoughts (Mostly Negative) About
"Bad" Samaritan Laws, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 971, 975-76 (2000).
19. See id. at 983 n.55.
20. Id. at 983.
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evaluation of the case.
Unquestionably, these are serious issues but they are in
no way unique to Good Samaritan legislation. Police and
prosecutorial abuses are reported daily in our newspapers.
While there may be good reason to continue policing the
police, should these concerns stop us from enforcing a duty to
rescue? With every new law there are new restrictions on
freedom, and there is additional room for new abuses in
enforcement. Nonetheless, laws regulating conduct continue
to be necessary. Always, there is the need to balance the cost
of implementing those laws with the benefits to be gained by
their imposition.
In this paper, I have focused primarily on Good
Samaritan laws in the context of the criminal law, in part
because of my own interest and experience, but also because
there has been more attention paid to the issue in the
criminal law context. Nonetheless, there is still a separate
question of whether such a duty should be required under tort
law.
Professor Marc Franklin addressed the issue of an
affirmative duty to rescue in the civil law context. He raised
two distinct issues. First, if the criminal law decides to
impose an affirmative obligation to rescue, might tort law
reach a different result? Second, even if no criminal
obligation is imposed, should there nonetheless be a civil
obligation? Beyond obligations, suggests Franklin, should
tort law or any other area of the civil law develop doctrines
that seek to encourage rescues and warnings? Marc Franklin
considered each of these questions, as well as their
relationships to one another. Focusing on practical
concerns-such as the severity of civil damages,
administration concerns, and the complexity of cases
involving multiple defendants-Franklin concluded that no
case for a civil law duty has been established.21
V. CONCLUSION
Questions that surround law and ethics and the debates
for and against Good Samaritan laws are not new. They are
21. See Marc A. Franklin & Matthew Ploeger, Of Rescue and Report: Should
Tort Law Impose a Duty to Help Endangered Persons or Abused Children?, 40
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 991 (2000).
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reignited every time another shocking incident occurs and
lands on the front pages of our newspapers. In the past few
years, the issue captured international attention once again
when Princess Diana and three others were killed in a car
accident in France. What shocked the world then were the
actions of reporters who stood around at the scene of the
crash and recorded the event, rather than helping the
seriously injured people.
In this country, the murder of seven-year-old Sherrice
Iverson brought the issue back home. All of us remember the
murder of that child in a casino just outside of Las Vegas.
But, more than the victim or her killer, Jeremy Strohmeyer,
we remember Strohmeyer's friend, David Cash, who watched
Strohmeyer assault the child, then left the bathroom and
waited outside while his friend killed the little girl.
Interest in the story of Sherrice Iverson's murder
centered less on her tragic death than on David Cash, the
only person besides her killer who was in a position to
prevent her murder, but who did nothing to help her. That
story generated more than 300 published newspaper accounts
nationwide." The sheer volume of news accounts of what is
now more commonly called the "David Cash case" is by itself
worth noting. But, fascination with the case and public thirst
for stories and information about Good and Bad Samaritan
issues raises yet another important ethical question. Does
the news media have a responsibility to report in a way that
assists citizens in understanding their communities and
institutions, and in thinking through and reaching considered
judgment on major social issues? As part of this Symposium,
Journalism Professor Edmund Lambeth analyzed this issue
in the specific context of the Sherrice Iverson murder case.23
So profound has been the impact of the subject of duty to
rescue on American culture, that the issue became the
catalyst for the final episode of the popular television show
Seinfeld. In that episode, the main characters, Jerry, Elaine,
Kramer, and George were taking a walk in a small New
Hampshire town when, just a few feet from them, a stranger
was robbed at gunpoint. The victim cried for help, but rather
22. See generally Edmund Lambeth, The News and the Good Samaritan





than do anything to help him, the four characters continued
their conversation, part of the time commenting and joking
about the crime they were witnessing. A moment later, a
police officer walked up and announced that they were under
arrest. "But, why?" Elaine asked, "We didn't do anything."
To which the officer answered, "That's just it, you didn't do
anything."24
For Jerry, Elaine, Kramer, and George, they had the
misfortune of "doing nothing" in a place that had just enacted
a Good Samaritan statute. This was extraordinarily bad luck
as it turned out, since there is no duty to rescue in most of the
United States. New Hampshire represents only a very small
minority of jurisdictions imposing a criminal duty to rescue.
In most of the rest of the country, the issue of Good
Samaritan laws remains unsettled. In fact, there is
considerable inconsistency in the treatment of a failure to
rescue throughout much of the world. Notably, there is a
wide divergence of views in Anglo-American countries, where
the issue is still largely regarded as a moral as opposed to
legal issue, and views in European countries where failure to
rescue is a crime.
To underscore this divergence, please allow me to take
you out to sea and to the case of Dudley and Stephens just
one last time.
As Neil Hanson explained in his new book, Custom of the
Sea,25 the rescue of Dudley and Stephens was most fortuitous,
as their chances of being rescued were slim indeed. There
was no way to call for help, their own ship had been blown off
the course traveled by others, and even when ships did come
across shipwrecks, the vagaries of winds and clumsiness of
maneuvering made rescue in the days of sailing vessels
highly unlikely.
But, Dudley and Stephens (if no longer Parker) lucked
out. A German ship, the Moctezuma, appeared on the
horizon and managed to pull the men aboard and to safety.
But let us assume a slightly different set of facts. Imagine
that the ship appears and from the crow's-nest, their lookout
spots the miserable raft of Dudley and Stephens. "Shipwreck
24. Interestingly, as part of the story line of this final episode, the
defendants' trial was a highly publicized case, acknowledgment by the show's
writers that such a case would capture the nation's attention.
25. HANSON, supra note 2.
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ahoy!" yells the lookout. Upon hearing this, the Captain looks
at his watch and realizes that if they sail off course to
investigate the bobbing raft, they will lose the wind, delay
their arrival in port, and lose a promised reward for timely
delivery of their cargo. "Sail on, fellows," orders the Captain.
"We haven't time to investigate." "But Captain," answers the
lookout, "there are survivors aboard." "Yes, I know," answers
the Captain, "but if we divert our course, we lose our bounty.
Sail on, mate, sail on!"
Is the Captain permitted to disregard the troubled raft?
If the ship was the German Moctezuma, as in the actual case,
or a ship from another European country, 6 the Captain would
not be privileged to sail on. However, in the United States,
except (as Seinfeld and friends learned) in just a few
jurisdictions, the Captain's actions are permitted. Should the
future of others like Dudley and Stephens, Sherrice Iverson,
and Princess Diana depend on the point of origin of a passing
ship or any other place for that matter?
26. Portugal, the Netherlands, Finland, Italy, Norway, Russia, Turkey,
Denmark, Poland, Germany, Romania, France, Hungary, Greece,
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Switzerland, Spain, and
Belgium all recognize a duty to rescue. See Melody J. Stewart, How Making the
Failure to Assist Illegal Fails to Assist: An Observation of Expanding Criminal
Omission Liability, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 385, 392 n.35 (1998).
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